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ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS ON BANK STOCK PRICES: CITICORP'S 
INCREASE IN LOAN LOSS RESERVES FOR THIRD WORLD DEBT 
ABSTRACT 
Citicorp's announcement of a sizeable increase 
to its loan loss reserve account was a landmark public 
admission of possible loan default by Third World debtor 
nations. This paper analyzes the impact of the 
announcement on Citicorp, the banking industry, and the 
stock market. The results provide evidence of a positive 
response to Ci ti corp' s action. There is additional 
evidence that the size of the market response is related 
to an individual bank's degree of international loan 
exposure. 
ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS ON BANK STOCK PRICES: CITICORP'S 
INCREASE IN LOAN LOSS RESERVES FOR THIRD WORLD DEBT 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 19, 1987, Citicorp's Chairman, John Reed, publicly 
announced that the bank was increasing (effective immediately) its 
loan loss reserves by $3 billion in order to cushion the bank's 
loan exposure against possible default by financially unstable 
Third World countries. Total foreign debt owed by the Baker Plan 
countries was $437 billion with $62 billion of it owed to the 
United States financial community. The tradition in the banking 
industry had been to renegotiate, stretch-out payments, and lower 
interest rates. Reed's announcement not only broke this tradition 
but also was the first public admission that the loans were worth 
less than their face value. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether there was 
a reaction in the market either to Citicorp or to the banking 
industry as a result of this announcement. A positive reaction 
might occur because the market approves the recognition of these 
problem loans; on the other hand, no significant reaction could be 
explained by the fact that additions to reserves are primarily 
accounting transactions. We also analyze the possible relationship 
between the size of investor response and the degree of interna-
tional loan exposure. The paper is arranged as follows: Section 
II describes the background of the international loan problem and 
Reed's announcement; Section III includes a description of the data 
and methodology; Section IV contains the results; and Section V 
presents the conclusions. 
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The debt crisis was initiated in August, 1982, when Mexico 
declared a moratorium on its foreign debt payments and almost 
defaulted on loans worth $82 billion. Since 1983, only Columbia 
and Venezuela have made any principal payments. In February, 1987, 
when Brazil announced that it would only pay interest to public 
creditors, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
major banks retaliated by classifying the Brazilian loans as 
nonperforming (9]. Talks concerning debt rescheduling were planned 
fo-r June. 
On Tuesday, May 19, 1987, John Reed held a press conference 
at which he announced Citicorp's intention to immediately add $3 
billion to its loan loss reserves to cover possible international 
loan losses. This was the public announcement; however, because 
of the possible tremors that could result from the announcement, 
Reed had conferred with the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, James Baker and the Treasury Department, 
and the rating agencies. Consequently, rumors of the pending 
announcement were circulating in the stock and bond markets several 
days before the actual date of the press conference. Despite 
leaking information, the bank's decision still appeared to have a 
stunning effect. The Dow Jones Industrial Average and the New York 
Index both declined the day of the announcement; however, the 
market stabilized and the indexes climbed back up. By the end of 
the week, the price of Citicorp's common stock had risen by five 
dollars. 
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Three studies (Cornell and Shapiro [5], Bruner and Simms [4] 
and Glascock et al. [10]) have attempted to analyze the market 
reaction to the debt crisis of 1982. Cornell and Shapiro [5], 
using cross-sectional regression analysis, concluded that, over the 
period from 1982 to 1983, foreign loan exposure did impact the 
prices of bank stocks but that this reaction was continually 
impounded in the stock prices rather than impacted on a few days. 
Bruner and Simms [4] stated that Cornell and Shapiro [5] did 
not answer the question as to how rapidly the market reacted to the 
Mexican debt moratorium. They tested two hypotheses. First, any 
new information concerning deterioration "will be quickly impounded 
in the share prices of the affected banks." Second, the size of 
the response will be directly related to the size of each bank's 
foreign debt exposure. Since the authors were specifically 
interested in measuring the effect of the Mexican debt moratorium, 
they selected August 19, 1982, as the event date and utilized 
standard event study methodology. They found that the announcement 
did convey new information concerning the Mexican loans and that 
the news was impounded in the share price of banks with this 
exposure. Furthermore, they found that it took the market six days 
to impound the news whereas Cornell and Shapiro [5] concluded that 
the impounding took four months. In addition, they found that the 
size of the response was related to the size of exposure, but only 
after day +5. They concluded that it took investors several days 
to discover an individual bank's exposure. 
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Glascock, Karafiath and strand [10] investigated whether 
international default affected the equity returns of all banks. 
They found multinational banks and regional wholesale banks had 
significant negative returns on the event day while regional 
consumer banks did not. consequently, not all bank stock returns 
were affected. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The sample selected for this study includes Citicorp and five 
o~her banks, including Chemical New York Corporation, Bankers Trust 
New York Corporation, First Chicago Corporation, First Interstate 
Bancorporation, and Marine Midland Corporation. Because our intent 
was to measure the market's reaction to Citicorp's announcement, 
the additional banks chosen had to be those which did not im-
mediately follow Citicorp' s lead and add to their loan loss 
reserves. In addition, the banks needed to have substantial 
international loan exposure and be listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The sample period was from December 1, 1986, to June 10, 
1987. We hand-collected daily security stock price data for 
calculating returns from individual issues of The Wall Street 
Journal and covered one hundred days prior to the test period and 
fifteen days on either side of the announcement date. 
The following is an abbreviated discussion of our statistical 
procedure, as is often presented by others (see Davidson, et, al. 
[6]); for a more detailed description of event-time methodology, 
see the appendix to Dodd and Warner [7]. 
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To test the market's reaction to the announcement of Citi-
corp' s increase in loan loss reserves, the single-index market 
model was used to predict returns: 
(1) 
where 
Rjt = rate of return on security j for day t, 
~t = rate of return on the New York Stock Exchange Index on 
day t, 
aj = ordinary least squares estimate of the intercept 
(constant term) from regression, and 
Bj = ordinary least squares estimate of the slope from 
regression. 
The parameter estimates are from pre-event data. The 
prediction error (PEjt) (excess return) for security j and event day 
tis computed for the forecast period as follows: 
(2) 
Prediction errors are calculated for each security over the 
interval t = -15 to t = 15, relative to the event day. The 
Cumulative Prediction Error (CPEi} over various intervals T 1i to T 2i 
is calculated as follows: 
T2j 
CPE j = I: PE j t • 
t=T 1j 
(3) 
The mean cumulative prediction error, for a sample of N securities, 
is defined as follows: 
.l N 




In the absence of abnormal performance, the expected value of 
the CPE is zero. The test statistic (which is described by Dodd 
and Warner [7]) is based on an aggregation of mean standardized 
cumulative prediction errors. The PEjt are standardized by their 
estimated standard deviations sjt as follows: 
(5) 
The standard deviation sjt is adjusted for each observation's 
distance away from the mean of the independent variable and is 
directly associated with the time series standard deviation for 
each firm. Due to the normal variation for different firms, the 
same size prediction error may have different levels of sig-
nificance for different firms. 
The standardized cumulative prediction error (SCPEj) over the 
interval t = T1j • • T2j is: 
T2-
I:J SPEjt / .,/ T2j - T1j + 1 . 
t=T 1j 
The test statistic for a sample of N securities is: 
N 




In the absence of abnormal performance, each SPEjt is assumed to be 
distributed unit normal; therefore, with this assumption, Z(CPE) 
is also unit normal. 
The event date for this study is May 19, 1987, the day of the 
Citicorp press conference. 
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RESULTS 
Table 1, Section A, shows the cumulative prediction errors and 
associated test statistics for several different intervals within 
the test period on a sample of all six banks. Several of the 
intervals are noteworthy. The entire test interval, day -15 to 
+15, has a CPE of .087 (Z=2.715), demonstrating an overall positive 
drift in residuals, or excess returns of 8.7 percent for the bank 
stocks over the length of the test period. 
The interval -15 to -6 is statistically significant with a CPE 
of . 049 (Z=2. 784). A large amount of the reaction within this time 
period may be traced to an even stronger reaction in the interval 
-11 to -9 (CPE=0. 032, Z=3. 311). We attempted to identify the 
source of this particular market reaction and discovered two 
possible explanations. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) carried an 
article on May 4th (day -11) announcing boosts in first quarter 
profits for big banks trading in currencies [17], with five of the 
six banks from this study being listed in the article. Two other 
WSJ articles indicated other possible explanations: one article 
(on May 5, day -10) reported the previous day's announcement of a 
reorganization of the World Bank in an attempt to broaden its role 
in managing Third World debt [15]; the second article (on May 6, 
day -9) reported an overall surge in stock prices on the previous 
day in reaction to a stronger bond market and a stronger dollar 
[13]. 
The short intervals leading up to and including the event day 
(May 19) are primarily negative and statistically insignificant. 
7 
A reversal of signs and a strong positive drift can be seen in the 
CPE's from day +2 through the end of the test period (CPE=0.066, 
Z=3.036). These findings indicate that the information was indeed 
a positive signal to the market. This positive drift appears to 
be fueled by a statistically significant reaction to two announce-
ments on days +2 and +3 (CPE=0.022, Z=2.576). On day +2 (May 21) 
the WSJ carried an article predicting that other big U.S. banks 
would follow Citicorp's example and increase their loan reserves 
for Third World debt [19]. on day +3 (May 22) the WSJ reported 
Citicorp's plan to cut loans to debtor nations by approximately $5 
billion over the next three years. The report also outlined 
Citicorp's strategy for accomplishing the cuts through debt-for-
equity swaps and sales [18]. It would appear that the market had 
previously taken a ''wait and see" attitude following the original 
announcement by Reed. The additional information released on May 
21-22 appears to be the confirmation the market needed to react 
with confidence. 
In order to determine the impact of Citicorp on the results 
from the first sample, we ran a separate sample excluding Citicorp. 
Although the inclusion of Citicorp increased the magnitude of the 
test statistics in those intervals discussed above, there was only 
one statistically different interval ( see Table 1, Section B). The 
statistically significant +2 to +3 interval from the complete 
sample (CPE=0.022, Z=2.576) appears to be predominantly influenced 
by Ci ti corp. The corresponding interval in the sample without 
Citicorp has a CPE of 0.006 (Z=0.549). It was, however, interest-
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ing to note that the three banks in this study having the largest 
Latin American exposure each had a statistically significant PE on 
day +3 (Z>2.0), while none of the banks with less than $3 billion 
in loans showed a statistically significant reaction on this day 
(see Table 2). This appears to be consistent with Bruner's and 
Simms• (4] conclusion that the size of the investor response is 
related to the degree of exposure of each bank. Glascock et al. 
(10] also found that international defaults do not affect all bank 
stock returns. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the single event date of May 19, 1987, we found no 
significant reaction in bank stock prices to the announcement that 
Citicorp had added $3 billion to its reserves against losses on 
loans to Third World countries. However, as expected, there was 
an overall positive trend in residuals across the test period. It 
is likely that Reed's preparations prior to the announcement did 
not go unnoticed, making it probable that the information was 
impounded in the stock price of Citicorp long before the public 
announcement. This may help explain the statistically significant 
CPE's during the first week of the test period. 
Furthermore, the market demonstrated a surge of confidence, 
as indicated by a strong positive drift, beginning two days after 
the event day. Our finding is similar to the delay found by Bruner 
and Simms (4], indicating that the market may need a few days to 
determine which banks will be affected by the new information. 
Also in agreement with Bruner's and Simms' study, we found some 
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evidence that the size of investor response is related to the 
degree of exposure of each bank. 
Due to the single event date for all banks in this study, our 
findings may suffer from a clustering problem. The decline of both 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the New York Index on the 
announcement day could indicate a market-wide reaction, which could 
mask individual effects on the banks in this study. Further 
research should be done to test the results using a two-beta model 
to adjust for industry effects which may cause a bias in studies 
such as this one. 
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TABLE 2 
AMOUNT OF LATIN AMERICAN LOAN EXPOSURE OF INDIVIDUAL 
SAMPLE BANKS AND THE DEGREE OF INVESTOR RESPONSE 
$ Amount of Loans PE (Daily t) 
Bank (in billions) 8 (Day +3) 
Citicorp 11.7 .048 (3.343)b 
Chemical New York 5.3 .033 (2.625)c 
Bankers Trust New York 3.2 .033 (2.065)c 
Fi!'.'st Chicago 2.6 .006 (.456) 
Marine Midland 1.8 -.008 (-.684) 
First Interstate Bancorp 1.5 .002 ( .160) 
8 Source: The Wall street Journal, June 8, 1987, p. 6. 
bSignificant at the .01 level. 
cSignificant at the .05 level. 
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TABLE 1 
CUMULATIVE PREDICTION ERROR RESULTS FOR ANNOUNCEMENT 
EFFECT OF CITICORP'S INCREASE IN LOAN LOSS 
RESERVES FOR THIRD WORLD DEBT ON MAY 19, 1987c 
(A) (B) 
With Citicor:g Without Citicor:g 
Interval CPE Z(CPE) CPE Z(CPE) 
-15 15 .0866 2. 7152 8 .0749 2 .154 76 
-15 -6 .0491 2.7839 8 .0517 2. 6960 8 
-11 -9 .0324 3.3115 8 .0301 2.8284 8 
-10 -1 -.0007 .0233 .0094 .5331 
-5 -1 -.0202 -1.6143 -.0156 -1.1672 
-1 0 -.0017 -.2010 -.0018 - .2110 
-0 0 -.0030 -.5817 -.0079 -1. 3200 
0 1 -.0087 -1.0138 -.0120 -1.2995 
1 15 .0607 2.7126 8 .0467 1.9111 
2 3 .0224 2.5756 8 .0065 .5485 
2 15 .0664 3.0355 8 .0508 2 .1165b 
8 Significant at the . 01 level . 
bsignif icant at the . 05 level . 
ewe have shown the cumulative prediction errors and associated 
test statistics for representative intervals across the forecast 
period, t=-15 to t=l5, relative to the event date of May 19, 1987. 
Column A includes the results for all six banks in the study. In 
order to determine the impact of Citicorp itself on the results in 
Column A, we ran a second sample excluding Citicorp. The results 
of the second sample are presented in Column B. It would appear 
that the only major difference between results from the two samples 
involves the statistically significant reaction of Citicorp stock 
on days +2 and +3, a reaction obviously not felt, at least to the 
same extent, by the other five banks as a group. 
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